1. 西安交通大学管理学院,西安,710049
2. 西安交通大学过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,西安,710049
网络首发:2010-04-10,
纸质出版:2010
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许晓雯 1, 2, 王嘉寅 3, 等. 肾源分配网络的局内交换机制设计[J]. 西安交通大学学报, 2010,44(4):23-27.
Online Exchange Mechanism of Organ Network[J]. 2010, 44(4): 23-27.
通过考虑有配型不合适的肾捐赠者的患者
同时为了最大化患者的整体疗效
发掘潜在的肾源数量
提出了一种肾源分配网络的局内交换机制.机制设有2个缓冲池
分别存放普通患者和失去活体捐赠者的患者的信息
而有捐赠者但配型不合适的患者等待进入缓冲池.通过寻找患者与活体捐赠者之间的交换圈实现活体肾源交换; 通过寻找涵盖普通患者的交换路径同时结合常规肾源
实施分配.在法律允许的情况下
该机制能够通过提升患者的优先等级继续发掘潜在的肾资源.竞争分析结果显示
分配交换机制的竞争比的数学期望受配型概率分布的影响
并依概率收敛
患者的总误配数期望收敛于最优值数学期望的3.13倍
机制的改进比仿真平均值为2.80
平均白细胞抗原错配位点下降35.6%.
An online exchange mechanism is proposed based on the kidney assignment network to maximize both the post-operation benefits of patients and the number of potential kidney resources when some patients have living donors who are not suitable in clinical experiments. Two buffers are built up to sort the information of common patients and those who loss living donors
separately. The pairs of patients and their un-suitable donors are waiting to enter the buffers. The exchange circles are checked firstly to implement exchanges among patients and living donors. Then the exchange route covering common patients is considered to make both assignment and exchange
and all patients and traditional kidney resources are taking into account in assignment. The mechanism is able to find out more resources through rising the priority levels of patients under allowance of laws. The result of competitive analysis shows that the mathematical expectation competitive rate is influenced by HLAmm distribution
is p.d. to certain value in theory
and the assignment network can control the expectation of HLAmm sum in 3.13 times of optimal one. The average improvement rate is 2.80
that means
average of HLAmm will decrease 35.6% by using the proposed mechanism.
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