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1. 国网甘肃省电力公司数字化事业部,兰州,730000
2. 西安交通大学电信学部,西安,710049
Online First:10 April 2024,
Published:2024
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YAN Xianguo, SUN Biying, LU Pengdong, et al. Padding Method-Based Double Auction for Power Resource Reallocation in the Smart Grid[J]. 2024, 58(4): 138-147.
YAN Xianguo, SUN Biying, LU Pengdong, et al. Padding Method-Based Double Auction for Power Resource Reallocation in the Smart Grid[J]. 2024, 58(4): 138-147. DOI: 10.7652/xjtuxb202404013.
为解决智能电网环境中用户富裕电能回售问题
完成电力资源的再分配
从经济学的角度设计了一种激励机制以鼓励拥有富裕电力的用户为电力紧缺用户提供电力资源。提出了一种双向拍卖机制
该机制包括使用填充概念的电力资源分配方法和有效的定价策略
以保证智能电网环境下电力资源分配的理想性能。所提双向拍卖机制考虑了电力资源传输成本与距离之间的关系
设计了供需匹配关系; 所提分配方法采用了基于线性规划的填充分配方法
以接近最优的近似算法
在多项式时间内得到资源分配结果; 在定价方面
分别采用了基于关键值的定价策略和基于维克瑞-克拉克-格罗夫斯(VCG)机制的定价策略
以计算获胜买方用户的付款价格和获胜卖方用户的收款价格
实现了双向拍卖中的真实性、个人理性和预算平衡。仿真结果表明
所设计的拍卖机制保证了一系列理想的经济属性
包括真实性、预算平衡以及个人理性
并且可以在多项式时间内得到近似最优解的分配结果
为智能电网环境下的电力资源再分配问题提供了一种有效的解决方案。
To address the problem of rich electric energy resale and complete the reallocation of power resources in the smart grid environment
an incentive mechanism is designed in this paper from the perspective of economics to encourage users with rich electricity to provide power resources for those facing power shortages. The double auction mechanism designed in this paper includes a power resource allocation method using the concept of padding and an effective pricing strategy to ensure the desired performance of power resource allocation in the smart grid environment. The mechanism takes into account the relationship between the transmission cost of power resources and the distance
and the supply-demand matching relationship is designed. Regarding the allocation method
the padding method based on linear programming is used to obtain the resource allocation results in polynomial time with a near-optimal approximation algorithm. In terms of pricing
critical-value-based and VCG-based pricing strategies are used respectively to calculate the payment price of the winning buyer user and the receiving price of the winning seller user
thus realizing the truthfulness
individual rationality
and budget balance in the double auction. The simulation results demonstrate that the auction mechanism designed in this paper ensures a series of desirable economic properties
including truthfulness
budget balance
and individual rationality. Furthermore
it can obtain the approximate optimal solution in polynomial time
thus offering an effective solution to the problem of power resource reallocation in the smart grid environment.
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