A security protocol for in-vehicle FlexRay buses is proposed in allusion to the in-vehicle information security issue caused by the rapid development of intelligent vehicles and networked vehicles. The protocol contains two modules: a node identity authentication module and a network security encryption module. The node identity authentication module uses a key exchange algorithm and a asymmetric encryption algorithm to ensure the identity legality of the connected node
and the network security encryption module uses the symmetric encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm to guarantee the confidentiality
authenticity and freshness of the data transmitted by a bus. Compared with previous protocols
the proposed protocol provides node identity authentication and protects the information security of the on-board bus without affecting the real-time communication of the bus. Experimental results show that the protocol provides all-round information security guarantee for buses from start-up to operation on the basis of real-time communication
and greatly improves the security level of the FlexRay bus information.
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