An online exchange mechanism is proposed based on the kidney assignment network to maximize both the post-operation benefits of patients and the number of potential kidney resources when some patients have living donors who are not suitable in clinical experiments. Two buffers are built up to sort the information of common patients and those who loss living donors
separately. The pairs of patients and their un-suitable donors are waiting to enter the buffers. The exchange circles are checked firstly to implement exchanges among patients and living donors. Then the exchange route covering common patients is considered to make both assignment and exchange
and all patients and traditional kidney resources are taking into account in assignment. The mechanism is able to find out more resources through rising the priority levels of patients under allowance of laws. The result of competitive analysis shows that the mathematical expectation competitive rate is influenced by HLAmm distribution
is p.d. to certain value in theory
and the assignment network can control the expectation of HLAmm sum in 3.13 times of optimal one. The average improvement rate is 2.80
that means
average of HLAmm will decrease 35.6% by using the proposed mechanism.
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