Based on the Ross signal model and the Myers pecking order theory
and after introducing the concept of control efficiency factors
the control degree that companies put on their managers is described
and an objective function that concerns the benefit-related parties such as new shareholders
old shareholders and creditors is established
and a general decision-making model for managerial leaders and shareholders is proposed. Through analyzing conditions under different control effects
the financing Roget phenomenon existing in the listed companies in China is theoretically deduced and economically explained. The proposed model also gives good interpretation to the financing choices for a mature market; particularly when the control factor
an variation of the new model can actually be converted into the Myers pecking order model.
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references
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